INTRODUCTION

Overview about phishing
Phishing is a form of online identity theft associated with both social engineering and technical subterfuge. The attacker persuades the victim to reveal confidential information by using web site spoofing techniques. Typically, the captured information is then used to make an illegal economic profit by purchasing goods or undertaking online banking transactions. As such, it has become a major threat to information security and personal privacy.
Phishing websites are forged web pages that are created by malicious people to mimic web pages of real websites and it attempts to defraud people of their personal information. Most of these kinds of web pages have high visual similarities to scam their victims. Some of these kinds of web pages look exactly like the real ones. Unwary Internet users may be easily deceived by this kind of scam. The impact is the breach of information security through the compromise of confidential data and the victims may finally suffer losses of money or other kinds. Phishing is typically carried out by e-mail or instant messaging, and it often directs users to enter details at a fake website whose look and feel are almost identical to the legitimate ones. Even when using server authentication, it may require tremendous skill to detect that the website is fake. Phishing is an example of social engineering Facebook Scam, the link being hosted by T35 Web Hosting and people are losing their accounts. There are anti-phishing websites which publish exact messages that have been recently circulating the internet, such as Fraud Watch International and Millersmiles. Such sites often provide specific details about the particular messages[1].
Damages caused by phishing
The damage caused by phishing ranges from denial of access to e-mail to substantial financial loss. More than 5 million U.S. consumers lost money to phishing attacks in the 12 months ending in September 2008, a 39.8 percent increase over the number of victims a year earlier, according to Gartner, Inc. Microsoft claims these estimates are grossly exaggerated and puts the annual phishing loss in the US at $60 million [2] .
The stance adopted by the UK banking body APACS is that "customers must also take sensible precautions ... so that they are not vulnerable to the criminal" [3] . Similarly, when the first spate of phishing attacks hit the Irish Republic's banking sector in September 2006, the Bank of Ireland initially refused to cover losses suffered by its customers (and it still insists that its policy is not to do so [4] ), although losses to the tune of €11,300 were made good.
STATE OF ART Existing system designs for antiphishing
Several anti-phishing techniques have been proposed in recent years to strive to counter or prevent the increasing number of phishing attacks. Generally speaking, phishing detection and prevention techniques can be divided into two categories: 1) E-mail level approaches, including authentication and content filtering;
2) Browser integrated tools, which usually use URL blacklists, or employ webpage content analysis [5] .
E-mail level approaches
E-mail filtering techniques used to prevent phishing are quite popular in anti-spam solutions, as both try to stop email scams from reaching target users by analyzing the content of emails. The challenge in designing such techniques lies in how to construct efficient filter rules and simultaneously reduce the probability of false alarms. Phishing messages are usually sent as spoofed emails; therefore, a number of path-based verification methods have been proposed. Current mechanisms, such as Sender ID proposed by Microsoft and DomainKey developed by Yahoo, are designed by looking up mail sources in DNS tables. However, these solutions have not been widely applied yet. Currently, the companies only provide the mechanisms in their own products and services free of charge [6] .
Browser integrated tools
A browser-integrated tool usually relies on a blacklist, which contains the URLs of malicious sites, to determine whether a URL corresponds to a phishing page or not. In Microsoft Internet Explorer 7, for example, the address bar turns red when a malicious page is loaded. The effectiveness of a blacklist is strongly influenced by its coverage, credibility, and update frequency. At present, the most well-known blacklists are those maintained by Google and Microsoft, which are used by the most popular browsers, Mozilla Firefox and Microsoft Internet Explorer, respectively [7] . However, experiments show that neither database can achieve a correct detection rate over 90%, nor the worst case scenario can be lower than 60%. Some browser-integrated tools, e.g., SpoofGuard, iTrustPage, and Liu et al., adopt approaches other than blacklists. One of these approaches examines the URL of a suspect page to determine if it is a spoofed address. For example, http://fake.net /www. amazon.com/sign-in may link to a phishing page that mimics http://www.amazon.com/sign-in as the target. Some other approaches focus on analyzing a webpage"s content, such as the HTML code, text, input fields, forms, links, and images.
Content based approach
In the past, the content-based approach, which analyzes the HTML code and text on a webpage, proved effective in detecting phishing pages; however, phishers responded by compiling phishing pages with non-HTML components, such as images, Flash objects, and Java applets. For example, a phisher may design a fake page which is composed entirely of images, even if the original page only contains text information. In this case, the suspect page becomes not analyzable by content based anti-phishing tools as its HTML code contains nothing but HTML <img/> elements. To address this problem, Fu et al. [8] proposed detecting phishing pages based on the similarity between the phishing and authentic pages at the visual appearance level, instead of rather than using text-based analysis. However, the proposed approach is susceptible to significant changes in the webpage"s aspect ratio and colors used.
PROPOSED SYSTEM
As phishers may compose visually similar phishing pages in many different ways with non-text HTML elements, such as images and Flash objects, the similarity of the phishing pages and the authentic pages are computed at their presentation level itself in the proposed scheme. Specifically, the phishing page detection is treated as an image matching problem.
The proposed system RBL(Robust Linking) Global Tool bar which consists of Overlay Module, White list Module, Black list Module and CCH Module, is used to detect fake website in different manner. Fig.1 illustrates the flow of the proposed detection scheme, which involves two steps: 1) image-based page matching, and 2) page classification. In the proposed scheme, a snapshot of a suspect webpage is taken and treated as an image in the remainder of the detection process. The Contrast Context Histogram (CCH) descriptor proposed by Huang et al. [9] is used here to capture the invariant information around discriminative keypoints on the suspect page. The descriptors are then matched with those of the authentic pages of the protected domains, which are stored in a database compiled by users and authoritative organizations, such as the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG). The matching of CCH descriptors yields a similarity degree for a suspect page and an authentic page. Finally, the similarity degree between two pages is used to determine whether the suspect page is a counterfeit or not. If the similarity degree between a phishing page and an authentic page is greater than a certain threshold, the suspect page is considered as a phishing page of the authentic page, and considered genuine if it is not a phishing page of any of the authentic pages in the database.
Fig.2 -Flowchart for image based comparison
Fig .2 gives the flowchart for comparison of phish page detection during genuine site process. In the following sections, a high-level overview of how this system can be used to detect phishing pages is provided. Then, the extraction of key feature clusters from web pages and using these clusters to compare two pages to determine their visual similarity are discussed in detail.
When the user enters the url of the web page in the address bar, the following steps are followed.
Initially the url is checked, whether it is present in the whitelist. Whitelist is a list of urls of web pages that are known to be genuine.
1. If the url is present in the whitelist then the web page is not a phish and hence access is granted. If the url is not present, then it is checked whether it is present in the blacklist. Blacklist is a list of urls of webpages that are known to be phishing pages. 2. If the url is present in the blacklist, the web page is surely a phish and hence access is restricted and the user is warned. 3. If the url is not present in the blacklist, then the process enters the image based comparison module. If the page similarity degree is less than the threshold then the web page is displayed. If the page similarity degree is greater than the threshold then the page might be a phish and a warning to the user is displayed. 4. If a phish is detected, then the blacklist is updated immediately. Fig.3 shows the flowchart for the image based processing for finding out the phishing pages Initially, a database containing the keypoint features of genuine web pages is maintained.
Fig.3 -Toolbar Algorithm
Based on this initial background, our proposed method can be better understood from Figure. 4. First, the presented webpage is verified against a blacklist (local and RBL) and a whitelist.
To check whether this page would actually try to mimic an official log-in page (e.g. contains a submit button, input forms or words like eBay, PayPal, etc). We introduced this step for speed optimization purposes and diminish the duration of the analysis.
Now when the user tries to enter into a website, the keypoint features of the web page to be entered is calculated. Then the calculated keypoint features is compared with the keypoint features maintained in the database [10] . There are 3 cases to be considered for here:
1. If both the pages have same keypoint features, then the page to be entered is a genuine one and not a phish. 2. If the page similarity degree is smaller than the threshold 0.6, then it is impossible to determine whether the entered page is phish or not, since it might totally be an unrelated web page. 3. As shown in fig.4 , if the page similarity degree is greater than the threshold 0.6, then the web page is a phish as the phishing pages try to mimic the authentic pages.
Fig.4-Phishing judgment
Contrast Context Histogram (CCH)
The color histogram, which represents the distribution of the colors used in an image, for example, is one of the most widelyused features for image matching. However, it is considered unsuitable for computing the similarity between webpages. The reason is that webpages usually contain fewer colors than paintings; thus, it is not uncommon to find that many webpages have similar color distributions.
In other words, the color histogram is not a useful discriminative feature for judging the similarity of webpages. The Contrast Context Histogram (CCH) [11] [12] descriptor is used here because of its effectiveness and computational efficiency. Originally, the CCH descriptor was designed to achieve scale-and rotation-invariance in image matching; that is, two images are considered similar even if one of them has been undergone various types of scale or rotation transformation.
However, such transformations are rarely seen in phishing pages because the pages must be very similar to the corresponding authentic pages in order to deceive unsuspecting users. Thus, a more lightweight design of CCH descriptor is adapted here for webpage comparisons. To construct L-CCH descriptors for an image, only the gray-level information is used, which can be obtained by averaging the red, green, and blue values of each pixel in the image. The Harris-Laplacian corners [13] are then taken as the keypoints of the image. Basically, the corner-detection method finds a number of salient points in an image. A point is considered a keypoint if it can still be
Figure.5 CCH-level
detected after the image undergoes various changes, such as shifting, lighting variation, color transformation, or format conversion. As shown in Figure. 5 a sub-region may contain some pixels with positive contrast values (the pink pixels), and some with negative contrast values (the green pixels). The information in each sub-region is summarized by averaging the positive and negative contrast values respectively; therefore each sub-region can be described by a 2-tuple contrast vector. Then the contrast vectors of all sub-regions are concatenated to form a 2n-dimensional vector and define it as the L-CCH descriptor, where n is the number of sub-regions. Finally, to make the L-CCH descriptor invariant to linear lighting changes, it is normalized it to a unit-length vector. The advantage of using a log-polar coordinate system is that this system is more sensitive to the image points nearby the center than those points farther away. For each neighboring pixel of a keypoint, the contrast value is calculated, i.e., the difference between the gray levels of the pixel and those of the keypoint. Having obtained the L-CCH descriptor for each keypoint, the similarity between two keypoints based on the Euclidean distance between their descriptors is quantified. A short Euclidean distance indicates that the keypoints are similar in terms of neighboring information. Based on this property, the most similar keypoint on a suspect webpage for each keypoint, K, on the authentic webpage is found by the following steps: First, a search for the two keypoints, A and B, on the suspect page that have the shortest and the second-shortest Euclidean distances from the keypoint, K, on the authentic page is performed. Second, K and A is considered as a successful match if the ratio between the distance from K to A and the distance from K to B is smaller than a certain threshold (set to 0.6 in the experiments); otherwise, it is considered that the keypoint K has no corresponding keypoints on the suspect page [14] .
Kmeans++
K-means++ (David Arthur et. Al., 2007) is another variation of k-means, a new approach to select initial cluster centers by random starting centers with specific probabilities is used. We observe that convergence rate of kmeans++ is higher than all other variants of k-means. Also rough k-means handles outliers in better way in comparison to other algorithms., accuracy of kmeans decreases and also take more time to converge. However performance of global k-means and k-means++ is better than performance of others. Efficient k-means++ algorithm gives better initial choice of clusters. To take the location of matched key points into account, the k-means++ clustering algorithm [24] whish is efficient than kmeans used to divide them into a number of coherent groups based on their spatial distributions [15] .
The algorithm ensures that the keypoints in a group are always in a neighboring region. The steps used in this algorithm are described below: to the closest center already choosen.
• Step 3: Repeat step2 until k cluster centers are chosen.
• Step 4: After initial selection of k cluster centers, Apply k-means algorithm to get final k clusters [16] .
Based on the results, groups of keypoints between the two web pages is matched by voting; that is, for a group of keypoints, A, on the authentic page, a group of keypoints, B, on the suspect page will be considered as A"s mapping if most of the keypoints in A match keypoints in B. Then a keypoint is defined as geographically matched if its group is a mapping of its corresponding keypoint"s group. In cases where two pages are dissimilar, the number of matched points will be small so that the clustering cannot even be performed [17] .
Maintaining Blacklists
Blacklist is a database that contains the list of phishing websites with their URL and their CCH descriptor. The blacklist URLs are collected from various websites like "phishtank", "netcraft", "Symantec".
IMPLEMENTATION
The RBL GLOBAL AntiPhish Toolbar add-on consists of the following modules: 
Overlay Module
The overlay module takes care of the position and size of the toolbar, and also the pop up user alert window. The toolbar consists of the following menus and sub menus 
Status bar includes :
Compare and Save modules
Whitelist Module
The whitelist module consists of the whitelist.xul, whitelist.frm, whitelist.mdd, whitelist.myd files which contain a list of genuine websites. Once the URL is entered it is compared with the whitelist and if the URL is present the website is loaded directly without any pass through the CCH Module [19] .
Blacklist Module
The blacklist module consists of the phishtank.xul and phishtank.js files and also it maintains a cache for 1000 URLs. This module is linked to the "phishtank", "netcraft" and "Symantec" web servers to maintain the database.
CCH Module
The CCH Module consists of the local storage of the web page snapshots and the keypoint features associated with each website on the local database. After a WebPage passes the "Blacklist Module", it enters here[20] [21] . The website being displayed and the green bar indicates that it is a trusted website and the status bar also not reporting any thing against the web page.
RESULTS
Fig
Fig.7-Popup message displaying
When the Mozilla Firefox browser with the RBL GLOBAL toolbar addon loads a phishing website. "http: //www.s1.signin.ebay.com.ithyip.com/ws/ebayISAPI. Phishing site Detection Popup is displayed asking the user whether to enter the site or to get out of here. Fig.10 shows the comparison of no. of records and false positives for different websites.
Fig.10 Comparison of false negatives
The additional feature of RBL GLOBAL which is very new, "Compare" has given good result than existing toolbars.
Fig.11 Catch Ratings of different toolbars
When using an RBL GLOBAL anti-phishing toolbar, the most important detail is that it accurately and conspicuously identifies phishing web sites when a user visits one. Since not all of the toolbars function the same way or provide the same types of indicators, we first had to create a quantitative measurement of accuracy. Some of the toolbars provide binary notifications (i.e. either that site is phishing or it is not), while some toolbars use a ternary system (i.e. a site can be phishing, not phishing, or unknown). Thus, we define catch rate as the number of phishing sites positively identified by a toolbar out of the total number of active phishing sites visited, with sites which had been taken down removed from the denominator. Fig.11 shows the catch rate of each toolbar over time. As can be seen, Spoof-Guard was able to identify the least phishing web sites, whereas google and RBL able to identify more. The results for the first time period are over the complete set of 100 phishing URLs. While the catch rate for real phishing sites is the paramount concern, caution needs to be taken with regard to false positives [22] . False positives pose a major usability problem for any security software. If a user is continually alerted to a pending a danger (in this case phishing) even when the user knows no such danger exists, he or she is most likely to disable or ignore the tool that is creating the alerts. Thus, while a phishing toolbar must identify phishing sites, it should also be careful to not identify legitimate web pages as phishing. Each toolbar was tested against 100 legitimate URL SpoofGuard erroneously denoted 37 of the URLs as phishing and reported that it was unsure about 55 of the URLs. None of the other toolbars had any false positives, although Trust-Watch was unsure about a few of the legitimate sites. Spoof-Guard"s poor performance on recognizing legitimate sites is likely related to the fact that it was the only toolbar to not use blacklists. Instead, Spoof-Guard relies on heuristics. In this case, the heuristics are sometimes overly aggressive. Since the toolbar lets end-users customize the scoring for each heuristic, it is possible to tweak these settings so as to minimize false positives. Based on our cursory review, all of the toolbars examined appear to have some usability problems. We believe that it is important for these problems to be resolved if these toolbars are to be effective. An anti-phishing toolbar could identify all fraudulent web sites without any false positives, but if it has usability problems, users might still fall victim to fraud.
CONCLUSION
Phishing has become a serious problem in this era of networking. Phishing brings about a feel of distrust among the customers and insecurity in the minds of the e-commerce companies. As a result of phishing the customers lose their valuable information along with their money. In this paper an innovative way to detect phishing websites have been discussed. Here, the visual similarity between the web pages is used as the basic parameter, based on which the fake websites are distinguished from the genuine ones. This RBL Global project which makes use of both list-datasets (whitelist, blacklist) and the image comparison techniques have been found to be much effective in detecting phishing sites. The experimentation with 200 sample phishing pages and 50 genuine pages yielded the following results; there are no false positives and 1% false negatives. As a part of image comparison, CCH descriptors and k-means clustering algorithm are used. Currently the addon is available only for the Mozilla Firefox.
